Who could have imagined, only three years ago, that we would be where we are today?

Spain, May 31, 2026

Question 1: How could we describe the state of democracy in Spain?

Looking at today’s newspaper front pages, May 31, 2026, and with the perspective of the last 20–25 years, how could we describe the state of democracy in Spain?

This is the question I put to Gemini¹. Here is its answer:

The state of democracy in Spain, analyzed in light of the highly alarming journalistic reports published and with a historical perspective of the last 20 to 25 years, is at a point of deep institutional crisis, extreme polarization, and the erosion of state checks and balances—a phenomenon that contemporary political science often terms “democratic degradation” or democratic backsliding.

To understand how this scenario came to be, it is necessary to analyze the country’s evolution over the last quarter of a century through several fundamental axes:

1. The Mutation of Corruption: From “Personal Gain” to “State Control”

Looking back at the 2000s and 2010s, Spain was shaken by massive cases of endemic corruption (the Gürtel case within the PP, the ERE case within the PSOE, the Palau case in Catalonia, or the ramifications of the Púnica/Lezo cases). That corruption was primarily linked to the irregular financing of political parties, illicit enrichment, and real estate cronyism.

However, current headlines describe a qualitative leap that is far more alarming from a democratic perspective. The conversation is no longer just about the diversion of public funds for personal or electoral gain, but rather about an alleged systematic use of state structures and a party’s apparatus to obstruct Justice, persecute judges, prosecutors, and security forces (such as the UCO), and shield political power. The parallel with Watergate used by the press is significant: it implies the instrumentalization of political fixers and the “sewers” of the state to neutralize the control mechanisms of the rule of law itself.

2. The Assault on the Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances

The fundamental pillar of a liberal democracy is that power checks power. Over the last 20 years, Spain has shifted from an imperfect but institutional bi-party system to a dynamic where the Executive has openly sought to colonize and weaken the independence of its counterweights:

• Justice as a Battlefield: The past failure to renew the CGPJ (General Council of the Judiciary), explicit attacks from political powers against investigating judges (accusing them of lawfare or political persecution), and control over the Attorney General’s Office have weakened the perception of impartiality. Headline reports indicating that judges were “persecuted by order of ‘The One'” represent the culmination of a process of harassment against the judiciary.
• Weakened Institutions: Politicization has reached bodies that should be strictly neutral or technical—such as the CIS (Center for Sociological Research), RTVE (public broadcasting), the Constitutional Court, or the CNMV (stock market regulator)—undermining citizens’ trust in state institutions.

3. From Political Alternation to Block Confrontation

Twenty-five years ago, Spanish politics, while competitive, operated under certain fundamental consensos regarding foreign policy, counter-terrorism, and constitutional matters. The onset of the 2008 financial crisis, the emergence of “new politics” (Podemos, Ciudadanos), the secessionist challenge in Catalonia in 2017, and the subsequent formation of rigid political blocks have completely changed the landscape.

• Today, politics is not based on alternation, but on the destruction of the adversary. Access to power relies on extreme or identity-driven alliances, leading to decisions of enormous constitutional magnitude (such as amnesty laws or custom-made reforms to the criminal code) being subordinated to the parliamentary survival of the Executive.
• This generates an institutional anomie: rules change not by general consensus, but out of arithmetic necessity, introducing immense legal uncertainty and democratic weakness.

4. Social Polarization and “Partisan Truth”

The quality of a democracy is also measured by its public sphere. In recent years, political polarization has forcefully spilled over into the media and society. Faced with headlines as grave as those cited, the social and media reaction tends to fracture symmetrically: one block considers it the end of democracy and confirmation of an authoritarian regime, while the opposing block tends to downplay it, labeling it a “campaign by the political and judicial right” (lawfare). This inability to agree on a baseline of shared ethical and democratic demands, regardless of party acronyms, is one of the clearest symptoms of an ailing democracy.

Conclusion

Democracy in Spain is not at risk of a sudden collapse or a traditional coup d’état; rather, it suffers from a progressive and internal degradation of its structures.

If the reports stating that the governing party’s number three paid illicitly to torpedo judicial investigations are judicially confirmed, Spain would find itself in a scenario of democratic emergency. It would reflect that the self-defense mechanisms of the rule of law have been severely damaged by those who hold the constitutional obligation to protect them. The perspective of the last 25 years shows that the country has transitioned from a democracy with problems of economic corruption to a democracy with problems of institutional quality, where the rules of the game and the separation of powers itself are under constant questioning.

Question 2: Where do we go from here?

Reading the previous answer — and after similar consultations over the past few days² — I would say that AI responses are generally accurate and balanced, but also tend to be somewhat optimistic. If the situation is not one of imminent collapse, how is it likely to unfold? Let’s examine it along two lines:

1. The most likely scenario.
2. The desirable scenario.

Gemini’s answer:

Your observation is completely understandable. In political analysis, analytical prudence is sometimes mistaken for optimism. When it is said that “there is no imminent collapse,” it means that tanks are not going to roll down the streets, Parliament will not be closed by force, and public services will keep running. However, a democracy can rot from within without needing to collapse loudly.

If we step down from abstract analysis and look at the two potential paths of development for the coming months, the outlook takes on a much gruder tone.

1. The Most Likely Scenario: “The War of Attrition and Chronification”

This scenario is not optimistic; it describes a prolonged institutional agony where the Government prioritizes political survival over the health of the State.

• Numantine Resistance and Judicialization: The Executive will not resign or call elections immediately unless judicial pressure becomes legally unsustainable (such as a direct and unavoidable indictment of the president himself). The strategy will match what we see in current statements: denying the accusations, appealing to the presumption of innocence, encapsulating responsibility within specific figures (like the former president or the number three), and attacking the source of the investigations by labeling them as “political persecution” or lawfare.
• Legislative Paralysis and Governance by Decree: With investiture partners (Sumar, Junts, PNV) publicly distancing themselves to avoid contamination (“we didn’t come here to put up with this,” “irregular financing is a red line”), Congress will become unworkable. Spain will remain without new budgets, governing via decree-laws, and with legislative activity at an absolute minimum. Partners will sustain the Government just long enough to extract specific concessions, but the political atmosphere will become “unbreathable.”
• Redoubled Assault on Counterweights: To defend against judicial progress, the power apparatus will intensify pressure on investigating judges, the UCO, and non-aligned media. This will deepen the gap of distrust that half the population feels toward institutions.
• End of the Road: The legislature will die of exhaustion or from an unsustainable drip of judicial rulings. The country will head to early elections in a climate of extreme social rage, where the campaign will not revolve around economic models, but around “democratic cleansing” versus “fascism”—leaving a country even more fractured and difficult to govern for whoever wins.

2. The Desirable Scenario: “Institutional Response and Regeneration”

The desirable scenario is not a fairy-tale happy ending, but rather the activation of the antibodies that any healthy democracy should deploy against a systemic infection.

• Assumption of Responsibility and Democratic Hygiene: Faced with the gravity of UCO raids at party headquarters and high-level indictments, the Government—either out of conviction or forced by its own regional barons (as voices already demand elections or motions of confidence)—acknowledges that the reputational damage to the country is unacceptable. The president immediately calls general elections, returning the floor to the citizens not as an act of defiance, but of institutional responsibility.
• Minimum Pact for State Neutrality: The winning party (whichever it may be) and the main opposition understand that the situation is an institutional emergency. Instead of using the “sewers” and institutional control for their own benefit, they agree to shield the separation of powers:
  • Immediate and definitive reform of the selection system for the CGPJ so that judges elect judges, eliminating partisan quotas.
  • Establishment of strict statutes of neutrality and professional suitability for the Attorney General’s Office, the CIS, RTVE, and the Constitutional Court, banning direct “revolving doors” from active politics.
• De-escalation of the Public Sphere: Political leaders lower their bellicose tone. They return to harsh but rule-based ideological disagreement, abandoning the practice of disqualifying adversaries as “illegitimate” or “traitors.”
• Judicial Strengthening: The justice system works swiftly, free from political or media interference, trying facts with full penal guarantees. The guilty pay, and institutions are cleansed, proving that in Spain, “whoever breaks it, pays for it,” regardless of their rank.

The tragedy of contemporary Spain is that the distance between the likely scenario and the desirable one is immense. The dynamics of polarization and the short-term incentives to retain power make the first scenario (that of attrition and silent degradation) the path of least resistance for political actors, even though it is the most damaging to the long-term health of the democracy.

Woof woof woof!

____________________

(1) The question was accompanied by links to the main press articles published on the subject.
(2) That’s the reason to choose Gemini in this analysis, cause using Google today is increasingly tied to receiving answers generated by its AI, Gemini.